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1.  Introduction
Over  the  past  40 years,  "active"  labor market  programs  (ALMPs) have  emerged  as  an
important employment  policy tool, particularly  in developed  countries. This  policy  envelope
includes  a  wide  range of  activities,  intended  to  increase  the  quality  of  labor  supply  (e.g.,
retraining); to  increase labor demand (e.g., direct job  creation); or to improve the matching of
workers  and jobs  (e.g., job  search assistance).  The objective of  these measures  is primarily
economic  --  to  increase  the  probability  that  the  unemployed  will  find  jobs  or  that  the
underemployed will increase their productivity and earnings.2 However, more recently the case
for active labor niarket policies has also emphasized the potential social benefits  in the form  of
the inclusion and participation that comes from productive employment.
The debate  around these labor market  policies is often formulated in terms of the relative
value  of "active"  versus "passive" measures in combating unemployment and its  effects.  So-
called  passive  programs,  such as  unemployment  insurance  or  social transfers,  mitigate  the
financial needs of the unemployed but they are not designed to improve their employability in
any  fundamental sense. On the other hand,  active programns  are meant to directly  increase the
access of unemployed workers.
As  the disincentives and dependencies inherent  in passive  programs have  received  more
emphasis,  ALMPs  have  become an  attractive  option  for  labor  policy-makers.  This  is  best
illustrated  by  the  now familiar "safety  net"  and "trampoline"  metaphors for  contrasting  the
passive and active approaches. Not only are trampolines more politically attractive but ALMPs
also  have a  theoretical rationale in  models of the  labor market  that incorporate  asymmetric
information  and  market failures associated with  investments in  human capital.  It  also  makes
sense at a conceptual level that these programs (specifically  retraining) would have heightened
importance  as  technological  change  increases  both  skill  requirements  and  the  pace  of
obsolescence. However, as the experience of the past  15 years or so has demonstrated, actually
implementing an active labor market policy poses many challenges.
The immediate question is whether these programs do any good. Evaluations of their impacts
are mixed, with  many programs assessed to have little or no impact on the employability  or
earnings of participants. Even where policy-makers judge the evidence more favorably, or where
they  feel compelled  to introduce ALMPs  for political reasons,  they must confront  a  host  of
complex  design  and implementation issues in order to  maximize the probability  for  success.
I We would like to thank participants at the seminar on "Labor markets in the East Asian Crisis: Applied Analysis and Policy
Workshop" held in Tokyo in October 1998 for their comments and suggestions.  We would also like to thank our discussant at
this conference, Yoshio Higuchi for his suggestions. The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the World Bank or the countries they represent.
2  Objectives  can focus  on the needs of employers as well, for example, to ensure a supply of appropriate workers. This may
assume priority in times of rapid expansion when vacant jobs rather than unemployed workers are the predominant form of labor
market imbalance. In fact, this was at least partly the case in the 1960s when active labor market programs were first introduced
on a significant scale.
1These include decisions about the complementarity of public and private roles, optimal resource
allocation,  targeting, delivery, monitoring,  evaluation,  and  feedback.  Effective  and  efficient
active labor market programs, then, require considerable capacity and, not surprisingly, most of
what is known about ALMPs is based on experience in developed countries. Clearly, however,
the role and nature of active programming will vary at different stages of development. And, as
the experience in OECD countries has shown, culture and institutions matter a great deal as well.
The purpose of this paper is to review the international experience with active labor market
policies and to discuss their applicability to the East Asian countries. While ALMPs have been
implemented to varying degrees in the region, they cannot be considered an important policy
instrument in any. However, they will require careful consideration from policy-makers as these
economies respond to the crisis and to the longer-term requirements of development.
In the next section, we provide an overview of active labor market  programs and  review
some key  issues to be considered in their design.  Section 3 begins with a discussion  of the
techniques  used to  evaluate  ALMPs and  then  summarizes  the evidence  on  the  impacts  of
ALMPs, identifying the key variables associated with successful outcomes. Section 4 covers the
experience with active programs in East Asian countries.  Finally, in section 5, we discuss the
applicability of ALMPs to these countries and the key considerations involved in developing
greater capacity in this area.
2.  Active Labor Market Programs: An Overview
This  section  includes three parts:  first,  a  brief  discussion of  considerations  involved  in
developing an overall ALMP strategy; second, a description of the main types of programs  and
policy issues to be considered in their design; and third, a profile of the recent experience with
active labor market programs, focusing on expenditures in OECD countries.
Active  labor  market  programs,  including job  creation  (public  works,  self-employment
support, and wage subsidies), training, and employment services can affect labor demand, labor
supply, and the functioning of the labor market in matching the two.3  The overall objective  of
these interventions is to increase employment and incomes.  They can serve equity objectives, as
well, most obviously when programs are targeted at vulnerable groups.
ALMPs can increase employment and incomes in various ways. They can play a stabilization
role in the sense of governments directly providing temporary jobs through public works or by
shifting  labor  supply  or  demand  curves  outward  by  offering  training  or  wage  subsidies.
Training, mobility incentives, and other employment services can reduce structural imbalances
by improving the match between workers and jobs.  By decreasing the number of vacancies at a
given level of unemployment, ALMPs can also increase employment by reducing both upward
wage pressures and labor bottlenecks.  Employment and income effects of active programs  can
also  be  transmitted through  attendant increases  in  skills  and  productivity.  Even  where  net
employment effects may not be significant for  some active labor market  programs, they  can
3 For an extensive categorization of active labor market programs. see OECD (1993), Annex 2.B.
2increase  the  attachment of  the  long-term  unemployed to  the  labor force  and decrease  their
dependence on unemployment benefits.  By assisting the most disadvantaged workers, ALMPs
can break down potentially negative consequences associated with "outsider" phenomena.
There are many ways,  then, in which  active labor market programs  can positively  affect
employment and incomes.  However, their  potential benefits may be  dissipated or eliminated
because of substitution, deadweight, and  displacement effects.  We will address these in section
3 when evidence on the impacts of ALMPs is reviewed.
2.1  Public Policy Issues
Policymakers must  address various  issues in designing and implementing ALMPs. These
include the overall strategy and more specific issues relating to program design.
The overall strategy for active labor market programs involves identifying clear objectives;
the composition  of programs  within  the  ALMP  envelope; targeting priorities;  and decisions
about the relationship between active and passive policies.
As we have noted, active programs can serve various objectives and policymakers need to be
clear  about which are the  important  ones.  The orientation of an  ALMP  strategy can be  to
moderate cyclical downturns, reduce structural imbalances or otherwise improve the functioning
of the labor market, increase productivity,  support disadvantaged or at-risk workers, support at-
risk employers or industries, or some combination of the above.  Each of these objectives calls
for different types of ALMPs and different client populations.  Table 2.1 provides an illustration
of how policies might differ depending on objectives.
Table 2.1:  Tailoring Programs to Objectives
Objective  Program orientation  Targeting  orientation
Moderate  cyclical  *  Direct  job creation (e.g., public  works)  *  Vulnerable  groups  (with
downturns  *  Wage  subsidies  least resiliency)
*  Training  (subsidies  or grants  to workers  or employers) *  Hard-hit  regions  and
*  Self-employment  support  industries
Reduce  structural  *  Employment  services (e.g., infornation,  search  *  Proximate  regions,
imbalances  assistance,  mobility assistance)  industries,  or
*  Training  occupations
*  Wage  subsidies
Improve  general  *  Employment  services  . All
labor  market  *  Training  (e.g., apprenticeship,  school  to work
functioning  transition)
Enhance  skills  and  *  Training  and retraining (including  in-service,  *  At risk or disadvantaged
productivity  apprenticeship)  worker  categories
(especially  for
retraining)
Support  *  Employment  services (counseling,  job search  *  At-risk or disadvantaged
disadvantaged  or at-  assistance)  worker categories
risk  workers  *  Training  (e.g.,  grants, subsidies)
. Wage subsidies
3Another  important  strategic  issue  concerns  the relationship between  active  and passive
policies.  As a general rule, countries with active programs do have unemployment insurance or
some other form of passive support.  For the most part, coordination between the two has been
partial at best.  A few countries including Austria, Germany, Japan, Norway, and Spain do have
integrated systems.  Others,  such as  Canada, are increasingly moving towards integration by
coordinating active program options with unemployment insurance.  This trend seems likely to
continue.  In the first place, attempting to reintegrate unemployed workers into the labor market
is  more politically  attractive  than  simply providing  income support  or insurance.  Second,
integrated systems may have positive economic outcomes. In the United Kingdom after a period
of  low  levels  of  intervention,  the  public  employment  service  began  interviewing  the
unemployment insurance claimants and found that even minimal contact reduced the number of
benefits claimed (OECD, 1994).  Furthermore, coordinating benefits distribution with job search
assistance can save on administrative costs.
2.2  Types of Active Labor Market Programs
This section discusses the various active labor market programs in greater detail and raises
some  issues  that  policymakers  should  consider  when  designing  and  implementing  these
programs. These issues are summarized in Table 2.2.
2.2.1  Employment services
Employment services serve  brokerage  functions, matching jobs  with job  seekers.  This
assistance comprises  many  different  types  of  activities: for  example,  initial  interviews  at
employment offices,  in-depth  counseling  during  the unemployment spell, job  clubs,  etc.  In
Hungary and Poland  in the mid-1990s,  for example, workers had  access to job  referrals, job
counseling, skills assessment, job  search training, resume preparation and job  clubs (O'Leary,
1998a,b).  In New Zealand they were  assisted through a job  screening interview, workshops,
follow-up interviews  and  personal  case  management  (New Zealand  Department of  Labour,
1995). In Australia, services offered include resume writing and interviewing techniques.
Job-search assistance services are relatively inexpensive and by providing job seekers with
better  information on jobs,  they  can also  help in  shortening unemployment spells.  On the
negative side, these interventions usually have "deadweight losses" in that individuals who find
jobs through these services are generally more qualified than most job-seekers and many likely
would have found jobs even in the absence of these services.
Some Key Issues with Employment Services
(i) Public/private sector complementarity.  Increasingly, public and private  services coexist in
many countries.  Public employment services (PES) are often justified on the grounds that they
are especially beneficial to the disadvantaged, including the poor, and the long-term unemployed
(Fretwell and Goldberg, 1994). Private (fee-charging) agencies typically provide labor exchange
services to more favored segments of the labor force, such as the employed, skilled, and white-
collar workers.  However, in some countries, private agencies are banned or restricted and public
employment service operate under near-monopoly conditions. While governments often need to
4provide these services to certain segments of the population, public employment offices should
not be viewed as substitutes for private agencies.  Private agencies can enhance the operation of
the labor market especially where governments ensure they operate to quality standards.
(ii) Integrated service  provision.  Another  issue to  consider is the integration  of employment
services with the  other ALMPs,  as  well  as  passive  programs.  Close  coordination  can  be
beneficial to the extent that the unemployed acquire the skills and knowledge necessary  to fill
available job vacancies.  This has to be balanced against the administrative requirements  such
integration entails.
(iii) Monitoring and evaluation.  As with all ALMPs, it is crucial to monitor  and evaluate the
impact of this intervention.  Various methods are used to enhance the  effectiveness of public
employment services in many OECD countries.  In  some  countries, administrative  data  (i.e.
number of registered job  vacancies, etc.) are used to set targets to measure the effectiveness of
the employment service, and budgets are allocated accordingly.  For example,  in Sweden and
Finland, fumds allocated to  the PES are  disbursed to  the  regional  and  local  levels  based  on
meeting their performance targets (OECD, 1997).
2.2.2  Labor Market Training
This includes training where there  is some form  of public support.  That support can
come in the form of direct provision of training (e.g, through public training institutes), financial
support for  trainees  (e.g.,  funding  training  costs  and/or  subsidizing  trainees),  or  providing
"infrastructure"  services (e.g., labor market  information, licensing, monitoring  and  credential
services). Most countries focus on three types of training programs: (1) Retraining aimed at the
long  term-unemployed (e.g., unemployed  for more than  12 months); 2)  Retraining  displaced
workers, especially those displaced en masse as a result of enterprise/industrial restructuring; and
(3) Training programs aimed at young people, often with special attention to school drop-outs.
While  these  types  of  training  programs  can  lead  to  increases  in  productivity  and
employability, they have a number of limitations.  First, they are relatively costly.  Second, as we
will see in the next section, they often have  little impact when the economy  is not performing
well and job opportunities are limited.  Finally, training programs can also result in deadweight
loss - i.e., participants who benefit most may have more skills to begin with and may have found
jobs even without training.
Some Key Issues with Labor Market Training
(i)  The role of the government.  Governments have a range of potential roles: direct provision,
regulation, providing information and standards, and financing.  Many governments are moving
away from the  role  of direct  provider  and  focusing more  on  addressing  market  failures  in
information and financing, while leaving more of the delivery to private providers.  This may be
a way for governments to foster the development of a relevant and cost-effective training system.
(ii) Role ofprivate providers.  In order to encourage private delivery, governments must create a
set of enabling conditions including: (i) ensuring that laws governing private provision are clear
5and do not discriminate against private providers; (ii) avoid excessive public provision  which
can crowd out private supply; and (iii)  let employment  growth lead the demand for training.
Countries where such requirements have been met  (e.g.  Indonesia,  Australia) have  seen the
growth of  a  vibrant and  competitive private  sector  for  training  while  the public  sector has
focused on providing services to the more vulnerable groups (Gill, Fluitman, and Dar, 2000).
(iii)  Linking training with the labor market.  Strong linkages between the training system and
the labor market require the government to examine its own intemal  structures and operations.
The  solution  in  some  countries  where  training  reform  has  been  successful  has  involved
developing  strong institutional  links  with  employers  and  making  training  institutions  more
flexible. In Chile, for example, vocational training institutes are governed by representatives of
employers, workers, and the  government and  this  tripartism  has  strengthened  accountability
while offering the institutes the necessary autonomy to respond to needs of employers.
2.2.3  Job Creation
These programs are intended to  support the creation  of new jobs  or the maintenance of
existing ones. Three general types of programs fall under this category. First, there are subsidies
to encourage employers to hire new workers or to keep employees  who might otherwise have
been laid off for business reasons.  These can take the form of direct wage subsidies (for either
the employer or worker) or social security payment offsets.  These types of subsidies are always
targeted to a particular category of worker or employer. The second category involves direct job
creation in the public or non-profit sector through public works or related programs.  Typically,
government  funds  used  for  these  programs  cover  compensation  costs  to  hire  previously
unemployed workers, usually  on a temporary basis.  Third,  support  is sometimes  offered to
unemployed workers to start their own enterprises.  This  can involve offering micro-financing
for start-up or operating costs, allowing unemployment benefits to continue where claimants start
their own business, offering grants, or providing business support services.
Wage/employment subsidies (WES)
These programs  have  been  used  for  the  long-term  unemployed,  those  coming  from
severely disadvantaged areas (e.g.  sectors  with high  unemployment),  and  special  groups of
workers (e.g., youth).  Subsidies have been instituted under varying economic conditions, though
most often during slack periods.  These programs often have a social objective in the sense of
encouraging employment and, thus, the social inclusion of disadvantaged individuals.  Detractors
argue, however, that it is difficult to design subsidies that actually meet the goal of creating jobs
in a cost-efficient manner.  They are often associated with deadweight  losses.  They also can
have unintended effects such as subsidized workers replacing unsubsidized ones or employers
hiring subsidized workers and laying them off once the subsidy period  ends.  Obviously, good
design and monitoring can reduce these negative impacts.
Some Key Issues with Wage/Employment Subsidies
(i) Duration and level of subsidies.  Wage subsidy programs are most often payments to firms in
the form of a wage offset in order to induce them to hire program participants.  The level and
6duration of these subsidies varies significantly between programs and  countries.  For example,
under the U.S.  Targeted Job Tax Credit, firms are paid 50% of the  individual's  wages for a
period of up to two years while the U.K. job subsidy program provides up to 100% of wages for
a period of six months.  While it is not possible to generalize about the optimal duration and
amount of the  subsidy, careful monitoring  and evaluation  of the impact  of the programs will
allow policymakers to arrive at more informed decisions.
(ii)  Minimization of deadweight and substitution effects.  As mentioned  above, these programs
are likely to be associated with high deadweight and substitution losses.  Careful targeting of the
beneficiaries is necessary in order to minimize these effects (e.g., individuals  could be hired to
work in fmns/industries  in which  there  is  excess demand).  It  is  also  important to  monitor
employer behavior to minimize program abuse.
Public works and direct public employment creation
Some  governments attempt to  alleviate unemployment  by  creating jobs  and hiring the
unemployed  directly.  In  other  arrangements,  the  government  contracts  with  non-profit
organizations or private businesses to provide jobs.  Most programs target  the displaced and the
long-term unemployed (i.e., the hardest to place) and, in some cases, youth as a way to introduce
them to labor market.
The  idea  behind  these  programs  is  generally  to  help  disadvantaged  and  long-term
unemployed groups to regain contact with the labor market, thereby minimizing  the probability
of stigmatization, skills obsolescence, and marginalization.  They can also lead to the production
of public goods and develop basic infrastructure; indeed, in many cases,  this, rather than job
creation, is the main objective of public works. 4 Another advantage is that these programs can
be  self-targeting on those most  in  need. Finally, policy-makers  must  recognize  that in  some
countries there can be a stigma attached to public works jobs which  may decrease the market
employability of participants over the long run.
Some Key Issues with Public Works
(i)  Targeting of programs.  When  the  objective is  to  reduce poverty,  targeting  can be  best
achieved by setting the appropriate wage. As a rule of thumb, the wage  offered should be no
higher than the prevailing market wage  for unskilled  manual labor  in  the area  in  which the
scheme is introduced.  This enables the program to  be  effectively  self-targeted  for the most
disadvantaged. Conversely, if wages are set too high,  public works jobs  may be  filled by less
disadvantaged workers and end  up  crowding  out jobs  in  the private  sector.  Restrictions  on
eligibility should be avoided; the fact that one wants  work at low wages  should ideally be the
only requirement for eligibility.  When demand for jobs  exceeds the budget, the projects should
be targeted to poor areas as indicated by a credible "poverty map" and should try to assure that
the assets created are of maximum value to poor people  in those  areas.  However, flexibility
should be allowed in future budget allocations across areas to reflect differences  in demand for
the scheme (Ravallion, 1998).
4 Only public works designed specifically to alleviate unemployment and poverty and not those routinely planned to construct
infrastructure are considered as ALMPs in this paper.
7(ii)  Management.  Tendering public employment activities through private contractors or non-
profit organizations has  also been  shown to enhance  the effectiveness  of public job  creation
schemes.  For example, an evaluation of public works programs in Hungary shows that those
which were operated by private contractors tended to be the most cost-effective (Fretwell, Benus,
and O'Leary, 1999). Another lesson from past experience is that programs need not be managed
at  national  levels;  decentralization  often increases  administrative  efficiency  and  facilitates
appropriate targeting.
Micro-Enterprise Development Assistance/Self-Employment Creation Measures
Technical assistance, credit, and other support can contribute to the creation and promotion
of small-scale new businesses and  self-employment.  In  countries  with  embryonic financial
infrastructure, private  banks  are  often  unable  to  conduct  comprehensive  risk  assessments
required to offer credit to unemployed workers who want to create their own business.  Public
programs to support small business loans can contribute to the removal of this distortion arising
from credit rationing.
In general, micro-enterprise development assistance (MEDA) programs have been offered
both on a universal basis or to a particular group. For example, such assistance has been offered to
the newly unemployed (such as in  Massachusetts, U.S., in  the early  1990s), to the long-term
unemployed (such as in Denmark in the 1980s), and to displaced workers (e.g., in Hungary and
Poland in the 1  990s). Similarly,  they have been available under varied economic conditions.
Program conditions also vary.  Participants may receive assistance to set up their businesses
as a  lump-sum payment or periodic allowances.  Often there  is "screening" whereby potential
beneficiaries undergo a  rigorous assessment which  evaluates their  likelihood  of  success (for
example, in Germany); however, in other countries, such as the U.S., screening has been more
cursory (Wilson and Adams, 1994). In most cases participants may also receive business advisory
services and counseling.
Few among the unemployed - usually less than five percent - typically take up opportunities
for self-employment  (Wilson and Adams, 1994). One explanation for this may be that individuals
are generally risk averse and, given a choice, will opt for unemployment benefits. Finally, policy-
makers must consider potential displacement effects of these programs whereby small businesses
who do not get assistance are disadvantaged relative to those that do.
Some Key Issues with MEDA programs
(i)  Appropriate level of support.  The experience  of successful  micro-credit  schemes, e.g.,
Bangladesh's Grarneen Bank,'  shows that good micro-enterprise  credit programs  have several
common characteristics.  They offer  small initial  amounts  of  credit,  with  subsequent loans
5Grameen  Bank has over two million members, 94 percent of whom are women.  Over time, it has demonstrated its ability to
operate with resources from the market, relying less on subsidized funds. It has recorded  loan recovery rates above 90 percent
consistently and has had a positive impact on poverty reduction.
8contingent on a good repayment record. They charge market interest rates and use group lending
with  community  guarantees  rather than formal  collateral and  they  have  flexible repayment
schedules.  Micro  enterprise  credit programs start on a very  small scale  and grow gradually,
which allows for some "learning by doing" on the part of the agency and the community.  This
also ensures that supervision and training activities can keep pace with the lending activities.
(ii)  Targeting/screening of participants.  Screening can be especially important for MEDA  and
self-employment  support programs.  Instruments should include  information sessions, detailed
application forms, interviews, pre-entry business advisory services, training,  and development of
business plans.  These can sharply reduce deadweight loss and greatly enhance the success of the
project.
2.3  Expenditures on Active Programs in OECD Countries
The  OECD has collected  statistics on expenditures  by member  countries on active  labor
market programs  since the mid-1980s. These expenditures have also been compared with those
on passive programs such as unemployment insurance in order to assess the relative importance
of the two types of labor market policies over time and across countries.
Figure 2.1 illustrates trends over time in spending on ALMPs by showing average national
expenditures throughout the OECD region as a percentage of national GDP between 1985 and
1998.  The relative spending level increased early in the 1990s and has continued at that new and
higher  level  through  the  decade.  This  increase  likely  reflects  both  an  increasing  relative
preference on the part of governments for active programming and the higher unemployment in
most countries in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. Analysis by the OECD (1993) confirms that
spending on active programs increases when unemployment rises.  In  1990, for example, a one
percent  increase  in  the  unemployment rate  was  associated  with  a  0.6  percent  increase  in
expenditures on ALMPs as a percentage of GDP.
A second point emerging from the OECD expenditure data is that countries generally see
active and  passive  programming  as complements rather than substitutes.  Where spending  is
relatively high in the former area, it is also likely to be relatively high in the latter. In 1990, the
correlation  coefficient  between  national spending  on  active  and  passive  programs  was  .60
(OECD,  1993).  After  diverging  in  the  early  nineties  when  income  support  jumped  to
accommodate  workers laid off in the recession, the  strong correlation resumed in  1993, with
spending  on active programs  slightly increasing relative to passive (Figure 2.2).  Nonetheless,
spending  on passive  programs  remains roughly  50 percent greater  on passive than on  active
programs in the OECD region.
Finally,  there  are major  differences across  OECD  countries  in  terms  of  the level  and
composition  of  spending  on  ALMPs.  Table 2.3  highlights these differences  for a subset  of
countries using the latest expenditure data available.
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10Table 2.2  Active and Passive Labor Market Programs: Some Key Features
Program  Description  and  Objective  Possible  Pros  Possible  Cons  SomeI  Key  Issues
1. Job  The main  objective  of  1. Helps  reduce  the length  1. Crowding  out  of private  1. What  is the role of private  job
search  employment  services  is  of unemployment.  services.  search  agencies  vis a vis public
assistance/  brokerage  - matching  jobs  2. Reasonably  2. Deadweight  loss  agencies?
Employment  with  job seekers. Job-search  inexpensive.  3. Benefits  only  a fraction  2.  Should  employment  services
Services  assistance  comprises  many  3. Used  to pre-screen  of job-seekers.  provide  integrated  services
different  types  of services;  for  participants  who may  get  3. How can monitoring  and
example,  initial  interviews  at  assistance  from  other  evaluation  improve  effectiveness
employment  offices,  in-depth  ALMPs.
counseling  during  the
unemployment  spell,  job
clubs  etc.
2.  Training  Aims  at helping  new  entrants  1. Increase  in  productivity  1. Usually  programs  are  1. What  is the role of the government
and  to the labor  force  and  and enhancement  of skills  poorly  targeted,  resulting  in  and the private  sector?
Retraining  redeployed  workers  (either  unemployed  individuals.  deadweight  loss  2.  How  can linkages  with the labor
the long-term  unemployed  or  2. When  well-targeted  2. Do poorly  when  the  market  be improved
those laid  off en masse)  to  may  benefit  some  groups  economy  is not growing  (i.e.  3.  How  cost-effective  are these
accumulate  skills that  will  (e.g.  the disadvantaged,  when  there are few  jobs)  programs?
enable  them  to compete  for  women).  3. One of the most  costly
jobs.  ALMPs  instituted  the most.
3. Wage  Generally  aimed  at the long-  1. May  lead to  permanent  I.  Deadweight  loss  1. What  should the duration  of these
Subsidies  term unemployed  and  youth,  employment  by helping  2. A worker  taken  by a firmn  subsidies  be?
these  are designed  to  individuals  develop  some  in  a subsidized  job is  2.  What  is the ideal level of subsidy
subsidize  employer's  cost of  work-related  skills.  substituted  for an  provided?
hiring  unemployed  2. Helps  individuals  unsubsidized  worker  who
individuals.  The government  maintain  contact  with  the  would  have  otherwise  been
pays part of the salary for a  labor  market.  hired. The net employment
period  of time following  effect  can be zero.
which  firms may  decide  to  3. Employers  may  view
hire the individual  and  pay the  workers  as cheap  labor  and
entire salary.  lay them  off once  the
subsidy period ends.Table  2.2 (cont.)  Active and Passive Labor Market  Programs:  Some Key Features
Program  Description  anddObjective  Possible  Pro  PossibleCs  S  i;esX
4. Micro-enterprise  Creating  and promoting  small-  I. Assist  in creating  1. High  deadweight  loss.  1. What  kind of support  - e.g.
Development  scale  new businesses  and  entrepreneurial  spirit.  2.  Small  businesses  who do  financial/technical  - should be
providing  self-employment  not get this assistance  may  provided  to those starting  up an
through  technical  assistance,  be displaced.  enterprise?
credit  and other  support. They  3. Low  take-up  rate  among  2. How can targeting  of participants
are often aimed  at countering  the unemployed  be improved  to minimize  deadweight
"market  failures,"  not in the  loss.
labor  market  but in  the capital  3. What  is the impact  of these
or land  markets.  programs  - what is the proportion  of
unemployed  that  take advantage  of
these  benefits, the proportion  of
businesses  that survive  and how many
additional  jobs are created?
5. Public  Works  and  Publicly  funded  low-wage  1. May assist  1. Crowding  out of private  I.  What  should  be the wages  on the
Public  Service  employment  to address  disadvantaged  groups  to  sector  jobs, especially  if  job?
Employment  poverty  and nutrition  regain  labor  market  targeting  is ineffective.  2. What should  the proportion  of
objectives  and create  contact.  2.  Stigma  attached  to them  wages  in the total program  cost be?
temporary  employment  -these  2. Leads  to production  of  may  not increase  3. Are these programs  effective  in
programs  are mainly  income-  public  goods  and develops  individual's  employability.  generating  employment  and higher
generating  schemes  rather  than  infrastructure.  wages  for program  participants,  and
autonomous  employment  3. Self-targeting,  if wages  are they cost-effective?
generation  are set effectively.  4. Should  private  or public
contractors  be hired  to implement  the
projects?
12Table 2.3: Expenditures on Labor Market Programs (Selected OECD Countries)
Australia  Denmark  France  Germany  Japan  Italy  Spain  Sweden  U. S.
LaborMarketProgram  {1997/8}  {1998}  {1997}  {1998}  {1997-98}  {1996}  {1998}  {1998}  {1997-98}
Public Employment Services  0.21  0.14  0.16  0.23  0.03  0.04  0.07  0.30  0.06
& Administration
Labor Market Training  0.07  1.07  0.35  0.34  0.03  0.01  0.21  0.48  0.04
a. Training unemployed adults  0.06  0.73  0.31  0.35  0.03  - 0.10  0.47  0.04
and those at risk
b. Training employed adults  - 0.34  0.04  - - 0.01  0.11  0.01  -
Youth Measures  0.06  0.08  0.26  0.07  - 0.42  0.07  0.03  0.03
a. Measures for unemployed  - 0.08  0.07  0.06  - 0.04  0.07  0.03  0.03
& disadvantaged youth
b. Apprenticeship and related  0.05  - 0.19  0.01  - 0.38  - - -
forms of general youth
training
Subsidized Employment  0.13  0.30  0.52  0.39  0.02  0.61  0.35  0.58  0.01
a. Subsidies to employment in  0.04  0.03  0.32  0.03  0.02  0.56  0.24  0.15  -
the private sector
b. Support of unemployed  0.02  0.04  - 0.03  - - 0.03  0.09  -
persons starting enterprises
c. Direct job creation (public  0.07  0.23  0.20  0.32  - 0.04  0.07  0.35  0.01
or non-profit)
Measures for the Disabled  0.06  0.30  0.08  0.25  - - 0.02  0.62  0.04
a. Vocational rehabilitation  0.02  0.30  0.02  0.10  - - - 0.04  0.04
b. Work for the disabled  0.04  - 0.06  0.15  - - 0.02  0.58  -
Unemployment  1.17  1.86  4.50  2.29  0.43  0.68  1.64  1.91  0.25
Compensation
Early retirement for labor  - 1.88  0.35  - - 0.20  - - -
market reasons
TOTAL  1.69  5.63  3.22  3.56  0.52  1.96  2.36  3.93  0.43
Active Measures  0.52  1.89  1.37  1.27  0.09  1.08  0.72  2.01  0.18
Passive Measures  1.17  3.74  1.85  2.29  0.43  0.88  1.64  1.91  0.253.  Evaluating the Impacts of ALMPs 6
In  spite  of  the  large  public  expenditures  on  active  labor  market  programs,  rigorous
evaluations of their impacts have been limited.  However, policy-makers are increasingly realizing
the  importance of  good  evaluation in  improving program design.  They want  to  know what
programs accomplish, what they cost, and how they should be designed to be cost-effective.  As
we shall see in the second part of this section, there is now a growing body of evaluative evidence.
First, however, we briefly discuss  the techniques used in performing these evaluations.
3.1  Impact Evaluation Techniques
Techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of programs can be either scientific  and non-
scientific.  Scientific  evaluations  are  of  two  types:  experimental  and  quasi-experimental.
Experimental evaluations require selection of both "treatment" and "control" groups -- those who
receive the assistance and those who do not -- prior to the intervention.  Quasi-experimental studies
select these groups after the intervention.
Non-scientific  techniques do not use control groups in evaluating the impact of interventions,
relying instead on statistics compiled by program  administrators.  Since there  is  no "counter-
factual" (i.e., what would have happened in the absence of the program), these evaluations are of
little  use  in  determining  impacts  (i.e., whether  participants  have  benefited).  However,  non-
scientific evaluations  can provide some information on deadweight loss, as well as substitution and
displacement effects. (Box 3.1 lists some commonly used terms in the impact evaluation literature).
3.1.1  Experimental  (classically designed) Evaluations
If large samples are randomly assigned to treatment and  control groups,  observable and
unobservable characteristics of the two groups should not differ on average, and so any difference
in outcomes can be attributed to program participation. The main appeal of experiments, then, lies
in the simplicity of interpreting results.  The program impact is the simple difference between the
means of the samples of program participants and  control group members on  the outcome  of
interest.  Although experiments have many virtues, there are pitfalls as well: they require careful
planning and design in advance of the experiment; there can be failure to assign randomly (e.g.,
because of nepotism, excluding high risk groups to achieve better results); behavior can be affected
by participation (e.g., "Hawthorne effect");  they typically incur high  costs; and  they can raise
ethical questions if some people are excluded from the intervention.
3.1.2  Quasi-Experimental  Techniques
In these techniques, the treatment and control groups are selected after the intervention.  To
isolate  the  effect  of  the  program,  econometric  techniques  correct  for  the  differences  in
characteristics between the two groups.  The main appeal lies in  relatively low  costs  and that
evaluations can be done at any time after the intervention.  The main drawbacks are that these
6  This section  is based  on Dar and Tzannatos  (1999)  and Dar  and Gill  (1998).
14techniques can be statistically complex and may not fully account for all differences  in the two
sub-samples. Techniques for adjusting for differences in observable attributes (e.g., sex, education,
region)  of  the  groups  are  relatively  straightforward  though  subject  to  specification  errors.
Correcting for unobservable characteristics (e.g., motivation) requires a complex procedure that
can yield different results depending upon specification. These quasi-experimental evaluations are
of three types: regression-adjusted  for observables, selectivity-corrected, and matched pairs:
Box 3.1: Some Commonly Used Terms in the Impact Evaluation Literature
Some commonly used terms in program evaluations:
*  Deadweight Loss:  Program outcomes are not different from what  would have happened in
the absence of the program.  For example, wage  subsidies place  a worker in  a firm which
would have hired the worker in the absence of the subsidy.
*  Substitution Effect:  A worker hired in a subsidized job is substituted for an unsubsidized
worker who would otherwise have been hired.  The net employment effect is thus  zero.
*  Displacement Effect:  This usually refers to displacement in the product market.  A firm
with subsidized workers increases output, but displaces/reduces output among firms who do
not have subsidized workers.  This can also occur in helping individuals start up enterprises.
*  Treatment and Control Group:  Program beneficiaries are the  "treatment"  group.  In a
scientific evaluation, their outcomes are compared with a "control" group of individuals  who
did not participate in this program.  The treatment and control groups could be  assigned at
random ex-ante (before the program) or chosen ex-post.
*  Selection Bias: Program outcomes are influenced by unobservable factors not controlled for
in  an  evaluation that  affect  who  participates  in  the  program  (e.g.  individual  ability,
willingness to work).  Bias can also arise as a by-product of  the selection process  where
individuals most likely to succeed are selected into programs ("creaming").
*  Randomization Bias:  Also known as the "Hawthorne effect", this refers to bias  in random-
assignment  experiments  whereby  individual  behavior  may  be  affected  because  of
participating in the experiment itself, either in the treatment or the control group.
Regression-adjusted for observables
This  technique assesses the  impact of participation in  a  program  when  the  observable
characteristics (e.g. sex, age, education) of the participant and comparison groups differ.  It is
appropriate for calculating program impact estimates when the difference between the participant
and comparison samples  can be explained by observable characteristics.
Regression-adjusted  for observed and unobservable variables (selectivity-corrected)
When selection into programs is not random, and participation in a program is due to both
observable and unobservable characteristics,  program impacts computed using the technique above
are likely to be biased. The concern is that even if participants and non-participants have similar
15observable characteristics,  there are some unobservable characteristics (e.g. innate ability) which
would cause non-participants to have different responses to the program if they had participated.
The most common technique to address this issue is the Heckman selectivity method to try to
control for these unobservables.
Matched pairs
As observable characteristics  of the individuals chosen in the control and treatment groups
are bound to  be different, these groups are likely to  have  different success  rates  in  finding
employment, even in the absence of active labor market programs.  To control for these spurious
differences, synthetic control groups  are constructed using  a  matched pairs  approach.  The
synthetic control group, a subset of the entire control group, is composed of individuals whose
observable  characteristics  most closely match those of the treatnent  group.
3.2  An Interpretation of Evaluation Results
We now tum to the evidence on program impacts.  It should be noted here that while we
have included some results based on evaluations in  developing countries, this  evidence mainly
focuses on the experiences of OECD countries.  Here we merely review the main conclusions
emerging from the literature.  Table 3.1 provides a summary.  For a more detailed review, see Dar
and Tzannatos (1999).
Table 3.1: Overview of ALMP Evaluation Results
Program  Appear  to Help  Comments
I  Job-search  Adult  unemployed  Relatively  more  cost-effective  than  other  labor  market
assistance/  Emp.  generally  when  economic  interventions  (e.g.  training)  - mainly  due  to the lower  cost,  youth
Services  conditions  are improving;  do not  benefit usually.  Difficulty  lies  in deciding  who  needs  help
(19 evaluations)  women  may benefit more.  in order to minimize  deadweight  loss.
2. Training  of long-  Women  and other  No  more  effective  than  job-search  assistance  in  increasing  re-
term unemployed  disadvantaged  groups.  employment  probabilities  and  post-intervention  earnings  and  are
(28  evaluations)  2-4  times  more  costly.
3.  Retraining  in the  Little  positive  impact - No  more  effective  than  job-search  assistance  and  significantly
case  of mass layoffs  mainly  when  economy  is  more  expensive.  Rate  of  return  on  these  programs  usually
(12 evaluations)  doing  better.  negative.
4.  Training  for  No positive  impact.  Employment/earnings  prospects  not  improved  as a result  of going
youth  (7 evaluations)  through  the training.  Taking  costs  into  account  - the real  rate  of
return  of these  programs  is negative.
5. Employment/  Long-term  unemployed  in  High  deadweight  and  substitution  effects.  Impact  analysis  shows
Wage  subsidies  providing  an entry into  treatment  group  does  not  do  well  as  compared  to  control.
(22 evaluations)  the labor  force.  Sometimes  used  by firms  as a permanent  subsidy  program.
6  Public Works  Severely  disadvantaged  Long-term  employment  prospects  not  helped:  program
Programs  groups  in providing  participants  are  less  likely  to  be  employed  in  a  normal  job  and
(17 evaluations)  temporary  employment  earn  less  than  do  individuals  in  the  control  group.  Not  cost-
and a safety net.  effective  if objective  is to get people  into gainful  employment.
7.  Micro-enterprise  Relatively  older groups,  Very  low  take-up  rate  among  unemployed.  Significant  failure
Development  the more  educated.  rate  of  small  businesses.  High  deadweight  and  displacement
Programs  effects.  High  costs  - cost-benefit  analysis  rarely  conducted  but
(15 evaluations)  sometime  show costs to UI budget  higher  than  for control  group.
16An  important caveat  with  these  evaluations concerns their  summary nature.  That  is, the
underlying  studies  treat  the  programs  themselves as "black  boxes"  in the  sense  that  issues
relating to  program design  and implementation, staffing, and  intensity and quality  of services
provided have  not been  evaluated.  These are obviously important factors that  will have  an
impact on the likelihood of the success of a program.
3.2.1  Job Search Assistance/Employment Services
Expenditures on these programs range anywhere from five percent of active labor market
program budgets (in Denmark) to over 70 percent (in the Czech Republic).  On average, OECD
countries spend about a  quarter  of their  active labor market program budgets on employment
services including job search assistance (JSA).  It should be noted that these expenditures include
the costs of financing job  search assistance programs as well as administration costs associated
with operating the unemployment benefit system and ALMPs.
Of the  19 evaluations we  examined, all except one are scientific.  Six of the scientific
evaluations are experimental and 12 are quasi-experimental. The evaluations suggest that JSA is
in some sense one of the most  successful active labor market programs: in the general case, it
costs  little  to  provide  and  the  program  is  not  any less  effective  than  alternative and  more
expensive ALMPs. However,  much depends on whether the economy is growing and  on the
availability of public funds (which can be scarce during a recession).
More specifically,  while  some evaluations yield negative results,  most indicate positive
results.  Less successful programs  are generally associated with periods of recessions and rising
unemployment rates.  For example, job  search assistance to those laid off en masse in Canada in
the late 1980s did not raise their probability of employment or earnings (as compared to a control
group) at a time when unemployment was rising.  In fact, participants who had been part of mass
layoffs spent  a significantly  greater amount of time searching for jobs than their counterparts
who did  not use this service  (Fay,  1996).  On the other hand,  the effectiveness of job  search
assistance seems to increase  when economic conditions improve and when new jobs  are being
generated.  During the  decline  in  unemployment rates in  the Netherlands  in the  late  1980s,
program participants were more likely to be employed than those in the control group (OECD,
1993). Evaluations in Hungary and Poland also show similar results (O' Leary, 1998a, b).
Studies which examine both cost and effectiveness data generally conclude that job search
assistance is one  of the  most-cost  effective of the active interventions.  For example,  Leigh
(1995) finds  that JSA  measures  cost two  to four times less than training and  retraining, but
appear equally  effective in  terms  of impacts.  This, of course,  does not mean  that JSA  is a
substitute for training; it is possible, for example, that those who use it are more "employment-
ready" than individuals who get training.  However, it does mean that if job search assistance and
training  programs  cater  to  roughly  the  same  clientele, policymakers  may  prefer  the  less
expensive option.
Overall,  then, the  evidence suggests that job  search assistance can have  some positive
effects and is usually cost-effective (relative to other ALMPs).  There does seem to be a positive
correlation between the likelihood of success of JSA and local labor market conditions.  Finally,
17job  search assistance  -- like other interventions -- does not seem to help all types of workers
equally; for example, these programs have had little impact on youth.
3.2.2  Training Programs
Training  (and  re-training)  programs  generally  account  for  a  significant  share  of
expenditures  on  ALMPs,  ranging between 40% to  60%  in most countries  and  over 75% in
Denmark (in the early 1990s).  Spending on training can reach many different groups, and in our
summary below, we concentrate on training (i) for the long-term unemployed; (ii) for those laid
off en masse; and (iii) programs geared towards youth.
Training Programs for the Long-Term Unemployed
We reviewed  28  studies  - six  experimental, 18 quasi-experimental, and  four  non-
scientific.  A few of these studies are longitudinal, so it is also possible to study the long term
impact of the programs.  Scientific evaluations suggest that these programs can have a positive
impact but this  is not always the case.  As noted above, in most cases, training programs are
generally  no  more  effective  than job  search assistance  in  increasing  either  reemployment
probabilities or post-intervention earnings.
The success of programs for the long-term  unemployed tends to be heavily dependent on
the business cycle: programs have performed better when they were instituted at times when the
economy was expanding.  A good example of this is Hungary where training outcomes seem to
have improved over  time as the economy started to grow (O'  Leary (1995, 1998a)).  In general,
programs seem to  be more effective for women (Puhani,  1998; Friedlander et. al., 1997; Goss,
Gilroy and Associates, 1989). Longitudinal studies indicate mixed results; while in some cases the
positive effects dissipated within a year or two after program completion, in a couple of cases the
impacts persisted.  For example, in Sweden, labor market training provided to the unemployed
raised their earnings in the short-term but the long-term impact (over two years) was somewhat
negative (Meager and Evans, 1998). Conversely,  long-term unemployed provided training as part
of the New Jersey Reemployrnent Demonstration  project in the rnid 1980s were earning more than
the control group 2.5 years after program completion  (Anderson, Corson and Decker, 1991).
Costs, when known, vary substantially. In most cases the costs are found to be so high
compared to the benefits of the program that, even if the effects persisted for 10 years, the social
return of the program could remain negative (especially  for males) (Friedlander et. al., 1997).7 The
U.S. JTPA program appears to be a rare exception: both male and female participants were doing
significantly better than  the control group and the training program was relatively inexpensive.
However, in spite of the positive results, evaluators caution that the aggregate effects of JTPA are
likely to be modest, both on the target population and on the labor force as a whole.
One of the major  implications emerging from the analysis is that training should not be
seen as a panacea for reintegrating the long-term unemployed back into jobs.  This is especially
7  The social return is based on a comparison of measurable economic costs and benefits and does not take into account possible
externalities associated with the reintegration of the long-term unemployed  into the labor force or of reducing high levels of
unemployment in specific regions.
18the  case  when demand  is slack.  When economic  conditions  are better,  these programs are
somewhat  more  effective.  Evaluations  also  show  that  tightly  targeted  on-the-job  training
programs, usually aimed at women and other disadvantaged groups, often offer the best returns.
Rigorous  cost-benefit analyses are seldom carried  out but the  limited evidence that does exist
shows that these programs are not usually cost-effective.
Retraining Programs for Those Laid off En-Masse
We summarize the results of 12 studies, five quasi-experimental, six non-scientific, and one
which used a variety of techniques. The studies relate to retraining programs for workers displaced
through mass layoffs as a result of major enterprise restructuring or plant closures. Unfortunately,
none  of the evaluations was longitudinal, so they do not provide  insights into the longer-term
effects of these programs.
Scientific, quasi-experimental evaluations find that though  some retraining programs may
result  in  some modest increase  in reemployment probabilities, this  result  is often statistically
insignificant (Corson, Long and Maynard, 1985).  The results for post-program earnings are more
discouraging: wage effects on participants (compared to control group workers) are rarely positive
and in most cases are negative (OECD, 1991).
Evaluations seldom report the full costs of retraining but, when known, direct costs (usually
measured as total recurrent program costs) vary between $3,500 and $25,000 per participant (Dar
and Gill, 1998). As noted earlier, given the finding that retraining and JSA have roughly similar
impact, this  implies that JSA  can be more  cost-effective in  assisting  displaced workers than
retraining.  Some researchers have gone as  far  as  claiming that  there  is  no evidence of  any
incremental effect above that of job search assistance for these retraining programs (Corson, Long
and Maynard,  1985).  As before, it needs to  be  stressed that these  programs  may be  serving
different groups of the unemployed and hence may not be direct substitutes for one another.
OECD country experience with retraining programs for workers displaced en masse may
be  useful  in designing assistance programs  in  transition  countries  and  other  economies that
experience large-scale labor redundancies.  The evidence on the lack of effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of these programs suggests that they should not be the principal source of support
to assist  individuals to move to  gainful employment.  If these  programs  are to  be used, they
should be small scale and targeted towards those subgroups that can benefit the most from them.
Training Programs for Youth
We have examined seven evaluations: five experimental and two quasi-experimental. These
evaluations  are  mostly  discouraging, even  though  the  programs  examined  here were  often
introduced in periods of relatively stable youth unemployment.  They show that training rarely has
an effect on earnings or employment probabilities of program beneficiaries (Fay, 1996).  A more
mixed, and more promising, picture arises from the evaluation of the Canadian Job Entry Program.
Though a quasi-experimental evaluation of the program showed that youth who only undertook
classroom training did no better, those who undertook enterprise training did significantly better
than the control group (OECD, 1993). This positive effect was attributed to participants staying on
19with the training firms.  Cost-benefit analysis of several of the youth training programs suggests
that the social rates of return to these programs are typically negative in the short as well as the
long-run (Friedlander et. al., 1997).  The evidence suggests that it is very difficult to correct what
appears to be a failure of the education system during the previous years of the youth's life with
some kind of training which is usually short in duration.
3.2.3  Wage/Employment Subsidies (WES)
We examine 22 evaluations -- six of which were  experimental, eight quasi-experimental,
seven non-scientific and one was of various types.  WES programs are among the least funded
active labor market programs in OECD countries. They attract less than 10 percent of expenditure
on active labor market programs and in both the U.S. and the U.K., funding for this program is
negligible.
Evaluations tend to agree that WES programs have high deadweight loss and substitution
effects.  In the extreme case of Ireland's  wage subsidy program, these losses combined totaled
over  95% - alternatively, the net incrementality  of  the  program  was a meager four percent
(OECD, 1993). Evaluations of similar programs in Australia, Holland and the U.K. also indicate
high deadweight and/or substitution effects (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Effectiveness of Wage Subsidy Programs
Country  7  Deadweight  and  Additionality(%)
Substitution  Effects  (%)
Australia  in  mid 1980s  (Jobstart  Program)  Deadweight=65%  35%
Belgium  in the early 1990s  (Recruitment  Deadweight=53%  11%
Subsidy)  Substitution=36%
England  1986-1990  (Training  Grant)  Deadweight=69%  31%
England  late 1980s  (Workstart  I)  Deadweight=45%  25%
Substitution-30%
England  mid 1970s  (Employment  Subsidy)  Deadweight=70%  30%
England  early  1980s  Deadweight=63%  27%
Substitution=10%
Germany  in  mid 1970s  (Wage  Subsidy)  Deadweight=75%  25%
Ireland  in the 1980's (Employment  Incentive  Deadweight=  70%  5-10%
Scheme)  Substitution=2  1  %
Netherlands  during early-  1980s  (Vermeend-  Deadweight-25%  25%
Moor  Act)  Substitution=50%
Netherlands  during  late 1980s  (JOB  scheme)  Substitution  =80%.  20%
U.S.  in  mid 1980s  (Targeted  Job  Tax Credit)  Deadweight=70%  20%
Substitution=  10%
Note: Additionality  is the employment  effect  after accounting  for deadweight,  displacement  and  substitution  effects.
20Equally disappointing  are evaluations which compared wages and employment outcomes
of participants with  those  of a control  group.  For example,  a longitudinal study  of the U.S.
Targeted Job Tax Credit  program found that earnings of participants were significantly higher
than those of individuals  in the control group in the first year.  However, this effect declined in
the second  year  and  disappeared  after  that (OECD, 1993).  Similarly, evaluation results for
Hungary show that  participants  were  significantly less likely to be employed  and earned less
(though not significantly so) than those in the control group (O' Leary, 1998a).
However, a few exceptions  do exist.  For example, evaluations of the U.S. Job Training
Partnership Act program, where employers were provided subsidies to hire workers in conjunction
with  on-the-job  training,  found  that  single  mothers who  were  AFDC  recipients  benefited
significantly, and males also benefited to some extent (Bloom, 1994).  In Australia, even though
the deadweight loss was around 30%, programs had a significant positive impact on post-program
employment - participants were 15% more likely to be employed than the control group (Webster,
1998).
In  summary,  evidence indicates that WES programs  are not likely  to be  very  effective
because of substantial deadweight and substitution effects.  Wage and employment outcomes of
participants are also  generally no better than that for a control group.  While very few studies
carried  out a  direct  cost-benefit  analysis, the high deadweight  losses and substitution  effects
strongly suggest that WES  are unlikely to have positive social returns in the way measured by
economists,  though  they  may contribute  to  some reduction  in  social exclusion  among older
workers and single mothers.
3.2.4  Public Works Programs/Public Service Employment
Public works programs are one of the most heavily funded ALMPs in OECD countries. We
summarize the  results  of  17 evaluations of  public works  programs,  13  of  which  are quasi-
experimental and four non-scientific.  The evaluations  point to some general conclusions.
First, non-experimental evaluations show some desirable short-run effects in  the form of
employment increases and unemployment declines.  Second, some scientific evaluations suggest
very high displacement effects which can reach 100 percent, as they did in Sweden (Skedinger,
1995).  Third, participants tend to have a smaller probability of being employed in a non-assisted
job  after participation in  the program, and are likely to earn less than their counterparts in the
control group. Finally, these programs do not seem to have a significant impact on reducing long-
term unemployment and whatever small short-run impacts may exist tend to diminish over time
(Webster, 1998).
These conclusions  are to a large extent predictable.  Unlike other ALMPs, public works
mainly  provide  current  benefits  and  are only temporary  escape  routes  from  unemployment.
Irrespective of their merits, an economist's  first impression is that public works can be generally
expensive (Table 3.3) and are not an effective instrument if the objective is to  get people into
long-term gainful employment.
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Egypt  Honduras  Nicaragua  Madagascar  Bolivia  Senegal  Ghana
Cost/job  (US$)  J  1401  2120  2580  786  2700  5445  2122
Cost/job  (PPP)  7212  9759  14302  3620  9388  12100  10610
Per capita GDP  (US$)  790  600  380  230  800  600  390
Ratio (1/3)  1.77  3.53  6.79  3.42  3.38  9.08  5.44
Source: Adaptedfrom  Subbarao  (1997);  World  Bank (1997)
However,  public  works  can be a short-run  anti-poverty  intervention.  For this  reason,  some
developing  countries  have  used  them  extensively  in  periods  of  hardship.  Some  recent  work
being  conducted  at  the  ILO  (Keddeman,  1998)  suggests  that  prograrns  of  labor  intensive
infrastructure  construction,  if carefully targeted  and properly  designed  and implemented,  can not
only  provide  a  valuable  safety  net,  but  also  can  contribute  to  further  economic  recovery  and
development.  Increased  involvement  of  local  communities  and  private  sector  participation  in
design  and  implementation  can  lead  to  improved  outcomes.  Clearly,  issues  of  design  and
implementation  of public  works programs  need to be studied  in greater  detail.
3.2.5  Micro-Enterprise  Development/Self-Employment  Schemes)
We  have  summarized  the  results  of  15  evaluations  of  programs  aimed  at  helping
unemployed  individuals  start  up their  own  businesses:  two  of  the  evaluations  are  experimental,
seven  are  quasi-experimental,  five are  non-scientific,  and  one  evaluation  is  of  various  types.
These  programs  come  under  a  variety  of  names  such  as  micro-enterprise  schemes  or  self-
employment  schemes  but below we  generically  refer  to them  as  "micro-enterprise  development
assistance"  (MEDA).
There  is general  agreement that  MEDA programs  have  high deadweight  loss.  Estimates
of these  losses  vary  from  about 30  % in the  self-employment  experiments  in Massachusetts  and
Washington  State  in the  late  1980s and  early  1990s (Fay,  1996) to  over 50  % in  Canada's  self-
employment  assistance  program in 1992-93 (Graves  and Gauthier,  1995) and Denmark's  enterprise
startup  grant in the late 1980s (Balakrishnan,  1998).
Table 3.4:  Failure  Rates of MEDA  Businesses
Program  Failure  Rate  of Businesses
Australia (New Enterprise Initiative, late 1980s)  58% failed in first year and 71% in two years.
Canada (Self-Employment Assistance Program, early 1990s)  20% failed within first year
Denmark (Enterprise Allowance Schemes, late 1980s)  60% failed within first 12 months
France (Micro-Enterprise Development, early 1980s)  50% failed within 4.5 years.
Hungary (MEDA, mid-1990s)  20% failed within first 15 months.
Netherlands in the early 1990's  50% failed within four  years.
Poland (MEDA, mid 1990s)  15% failed within first two years.
U-S. in Washington (Self-Employment  Experiment, 1990)  37% failed within the first 15 months
Evaluations  show  that  businesses  are  short-lived;  typically  one-third  to  one-half  of
MEDA-created  businesses  close down  in the  first year  of their  operation  (Table  3.4).8 Evidence
We do not have data on failure  rate of small  businesses  who did not take part in MEDA  programs. However, anecdotal
evidence  seems  to suggest  that usually  these  rates  are similar  to those  of that  of MEDA businesses.  Thus, while MEDA created
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likely to  succeed, and  even though  a majority of businesses may close, these  individuals  are
likely to move to employment in another industry rather than into unemployment.
Thus, while there are high deadweight losses and high rates of business  failures, MEDA
participants seem to  fare reasonably well in  terms of employment outcomes  as compared to a
control group.  Scientific evaluations show that participants are more likely to  be employed, than
individuals in the control group.  However, this does not necessarily translate into higher earnings.
For example, in the Washington self-employment experiment, while participants are  more likely
to have been employed than the control group, they earn significantly less (Fay, 1996). In Hungary
and the Czech Republic, participants were more likely to be employed compared to individuals in
the control group, but earned $30/month less.  In the case of Poland, on the other hand, participants
were 25 percent more likely to be employed than the control group and earned significantly more.
In the Hungarian and Polish programs, women and older workers generally had better outcomes
than individuals in other sub-groups (Fretwell, Benus and O'Leary, 1999).
Even in cases of  businesses that  survive, there  is only  a  small multiplier  effect.  Most
surviving businesses create, on average, half an  additional job.  In Hungary,  each  surviving
enterprise created 0.3 additional jobs, in France, 0.5, and in Australia, during a period of declining
unemployment,  0.7  jobs (OECD, 1993; Wilson and Adams, 1994).
The cost-benefit issue has rarely been addressed.  Where  available, data indicate that the
cost of  starting up  a  small business varies  from  $4,500 (in  France)  to  $13,000-$14,000  (in
Canada and Denmark). The Canadian evaluation concludes that the long-term cost-effectiveness
of these programs is uncertain, while preliminary analysis from Poland and Hungary indicates a
loss to  the  unemployment  insurance  system  with  both  the  average  duration  and  level  of
unemployment benefits paid to participants being greater than those paid to  individuals  in the
control  group.  However,  it  would  be  premature  to  draw  any  conclusions  on  the  cost-
effectiveness of these programs on the basis of so little evidence.
Overall, evaluations  suggest that  these  programs  work  for  only  a  small  subset  of  the
unemployed population  and  are  associated  with  high  deadweight  and  displacement  effects
rendering the net effects of these programs quite low.  The business failure rates are quite high in
most cases (though businesses assisted through  mentoring and  business counseling  are more
likely to succeed).  As in the case of training, assistance targeted at particular  groups -- in this
case women and older individuals -- seems to have a greater likelihood of success.
4.  East Asian Experience with ALMPs
A strong tradition of active labor market programs does not  exist in East  Asia. The one
exception has  been the  fairly  widespread  use  of  public  works  to  create  work  or  earning
opportunities on a short-term basis. Other instruments like retraining and employment  services,
however, have not been used on any significant scale to integrate unemployed workers into the
businesses do no worse in terms of survival rates than businesses which did not benefit from the program, they do not appear to
do any better.
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regarding the role of public policy.  It also reflects the low unemployment rates in most countries
prior to 1997.
The potential  application  of  ALMPs  in  the  region  has  changed  with  the  crisis.  The
increases  in  unemployment,  the  difficulties  facing  many  laid-off  workers  in  reestablishing
employment and earnings, and the obstacles facing young people trying to enter the labor force
have all underscored the need for policy-makers to consider new options.  At the same time that
the  crisis has  increased  the need for  ALMPs,  however,  fiscal  pressures  have restricted the
capacity of governments to spend in this area.
Nonetheless, even with these constraints, governments in all countries have been pushed to
assess how they could use active labor market interventions to help alleviate the unemployment
problems. This is particularly important since unemployment insurance only exists in Korea.  As
this section demonstrates, there have been some interesting and promising innovations in the use
of information technology, in financing retraining, and in supporting job creation in small firns,
to offer just a few examples. 9 But many problems must be confronted if ALMPs are to make an
important contribution in the region, not only in response to the crisis but in the development of a
long-run labor policy framework.
This  section  is  organized  to  provide  an  overview  of  the  regional  experience  with
employment services, training, and job creation. The text highlights some important themes that
have emerged in the region; examples are offered from the papers  for illustrative purposes but
there is no attempt to be exhaustive. Tables 4.1 to 4.3 summarize the country activities in each of
these areas. 1I
4.1  Employment Services
All countries within the region have public  employment  services (PES) responsible for
gathering information on job  seekers and vacancies and providing  access to services that will
match the two. These services are delivered through a network  of employment bureaus in each
country. The Philippines has an extensive network of public  employment service offices (1,825
across the country) which has been buttressed by new offices opened up since the crisis.  While
PES offices seem quite numerous in the  other countries  (for  example, Korea has about 120,
Malaysia about 40, and Thailand has 85), in fact their size, population,  and topography make it
very difficult to provide complete geographical coverage.
Another constraint  stems from what  the PES can offer  in terms of  services to help the
unemployed.  In most western countries, the importance  of  the public  employment service is
driven  first  and  foremost  by  its  role  in  delivering  unemployment  insurance  benefits  (and
validating job availability and other criteria).  Another important PES role involves its point-of-
access to labor market programs like retraining and job  search assistance.  A third relates to its
role in disseminating labor market information to workers, employers, and service providers.  In
9 It must be mentioned here that the programs that have been put in place during the crisis have not been rigorously evaluated
0 The material used for this section is drawn from the country reports prepared for the World Bank/lLO/JMOL-JIL project.
24the East Asian countries, unemployment insurance does not exist (except in Korea).  The active
labor  market  programs  that  unemployed  workers  might  access  through  the  PES  are  less
substantial  than in the west.  Finally,  the availability  of labor market information that can be
applied to decision-making is limited (and where it does exist, it is inadequately utilized).
On the positive side, though, policy  makers can take advantage of what has been learned
about  effective  employment  services  in  the  developed  nations.  The importance  of  service
coordination and integration and the complementarity  of public and private service delivery are
two examples of such lessons.  The effective use of technology is another.
Ultimately, the value of PES as an element of active labor market policy depends on how
well  it  is  integrated  with  other  aspects  of  labor  policy  (active  and  passive).  Korea,  the
Philippines,  and  (perhaps)  Indonesia  are  moving  in the  direction of transforming  traditional
employment  offices into  "one-stop"  or  "single-wicket"  centers where job  seekers can access
unemployment  benefits  (in  the  case  of  Korea),  job  search assistance,  and/or placement  in
vocational training.  Throughout the region,  committees,  task forces, and coordinating bodies
have been  established either  under  government  or  tripartite auspices to  examine how service
integration and coordination can improve labor adjustment.
All countries also allow private companies  to provide employment services alongside the
public  system,  although  in  some  cases  (e.g.,  Indonesia),  there  are  concerns  about whether
government regulation is optimal in an efficiency sense.  Currently the private service providers
are facing difficulties because of depressed business conditions (e.g., Malaysia) while the public
systems are being forced to handle rapidly  increasing loads.  In Korea, for example, the number
of job seekers using the PES increased almost ten-fold from 1997 to 1998.
The use of information technology,  and  its apparent effectiveness, varies throughout the
region.  In  Malaysia  and  Korea,  employment  offices  in  different  areas  are  able  to  share
information about job  seekers and  vacancies  via networks and the internet.  In Malaysia, the
Employment  Service  Automatic  Reporting  System  assists  the  Manpower  Department  in
matching the skills, characteristics, and aspirations  of job  seekers with the requirements of job
vacancies.  In Korea, the government has recently launched an electronic labor exchange system,
"Work-Net," which provides information on job vacancies, vocational training, career guidance,
employment policies, employment insurance  and labor market statistics.  In the Philippines, the
public can access job vacancy and job applicant  information in selected government offices and
via the internet through "Phil-Jobnet," an electronic information system.
However, computer, training, and  networking deficiencies constrain IT effectiveness and
its impact on informnation  systems in much of the region.  The Philippines network, for example,
has registered only 1,500 vacancies and 6,000 workers in its first year of operation.  In Indonesia,
computerized data in district employment service offices is not networked between regions.  And
because many staff do not have appropriate training or experience, much of the data collection
and analysis on job vacancies and job seekers continues to be done manually.
Another  important element  of employment  services involves counseling and placement
services.  However, there  seems to be limited  activity in this area.  Korea has  stepped up its
25placement and counseling services by rapidly increasing the number of counselors in the PES.  In
Thailand and the Philippines, the employment departments have been holding job  fairs to bring
prospective employers face to face with job seekers.  Counseling is also provided at the job fairs
and in educational institutions and other outreach venues.
A final point concerns the evaluation of the effectiveness of employment services in the
region.  Placement rates  are the most  commonly used indicator.  This indicator has not been
favorable since the crisis.  In Korea, for example, where a survey on unemployment and welfare
needs found that only  5.8% of the unemployed succeeded  in finding jobs  through  the public
employment services.  Clearly, if unemployed workers in Korea find jobs, other means are more
important than the PES.  Information from Thailand suggests various reasons for the difficulties
registered workers have finding jobs  through the PES in that country. These include a mismatch
between their qualifications  and job  requirements, a mismatch between their expectations and
available jobs, and the use by employers of non-PSE channels to find workers.
4.2  Labor Market Training
The overall profile  of training had been increasing in East Asia as the region has moved
along  a  long-run  development  path  towards higher-skill  activities.  All  countries  now  have
national,  and  somewhat  complex,  systems  of vocational  training.  For  the  most  part,  these
systems are heavily public in nature. In each country, the training system is the responsibility of
the national government.
Not  surprisingly,  the  crisis has  changed the context  for training.  On the one  hand, the
increased unemployment has created pressure to step up training activities to reintegrate laid-off
workers into the job  market  and  to  provide social relief.  In Korea, for  example,  vocational
training programs for the unemployed were provided to eight times as many people in 1998 as in
1997.  In Thailand, the  Department of Employment has launched a special program to retrain
workers laid off due to the financial crisis; over 27,000 unemployed workers have attended the
three-month training courses. On the other hand, vocational training and education in Indonesia
has had to decrease because of the worsening fiscal situation.
Attention to training systems in the wake of the crisis has revealed a number of important
challenges that need to be addressed over the longer run if the countries in the region are going to
improve job training.  Some of these are common across East Asia. These include the need for
better coordination and a stronger demand-side orientation in the training offered.
There  is  a  limited  amount  of  coordination  between  different  arms  of  government
responsible for various  components  of vocational education and  training.  For example, the
Philippines  country  report  highlighted  problems  associated  with  overlapping  vocational
educational and training  activities among three government agencies.  In Thailand, as well, three
government departments  have principal responsibility for  key aspects of vocational  education
and  training.  A  recent  report  in  Indonesia  identified  19  different  departments  that  have
established and regulate 815 vocational training programs.
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demand. This is a problem in all of the countries.  The need to generate more high-technology
training, for example, has come up throughout the region.  There are some initiatives in this area.
For  example,  the  Malaysian  government  has  recently  established  three  centers  for  high-
technology skills training and has negotiated bilateral agreements with France and Germany for
additional facilities in coming years.  Countries are also making attempts to increase the role of
the private sector in training.
Private training institutions  represent a vehicle  for getting the private sector involved in
training.  The Philippines and Thailand report increasing prominence of private providers but, as
we  have  already  pointed  out,  public  institutions  predominate  in  the  region.  Even  in  the
Philippines  where the  private  trainers  are  probably  the most  important, the  sector is  facing
constraints  in  terms  of  access  to  credit  and  competition  from  highly  subsidized  public
institutions.  A more neutral policy  environment,  or  even one  that encourages the  growth of
private providers, is likely to lead to a more efficient  and responsive training sector."  I  However,
as we have noted earlier, this may require some standards and accreditation arrangements.
It should be noted that there are a number  of innovations being introduced regarding the
financing of training. While there  is no guarantee  that all of these will be useful, it is important
for  policy-makers  to  try  new  ideas  in  this  area  given  the  well-known  financial  market
imperfections in the human capital market.  In Korea, the Employment Insurance System (EIS)
provides financial incentives for both employers  and employees.  Employers can apply from a
special EIS fund to implement various education and training  activities, including offering paid
educational/training leave.  A pilot program for training vouchers was launched in 1998 in Korea
with the objective of providing more choice in the training system.  A voucher-style scholarship
program has also been introduced in the Philippines  through the government-sponsored Private
Education  Student  Finance  Assistance  programs.  In  Malaysia,  the  Human  Resources
Development  Council  (HRDC)  encourages  the  retraining  and  skill  upgrading  of  current
employees and levies on HRDC-registered firms form a fund to be accessed for training.
One final area to discuss concerns the  training  of young people. There has been interest
through the region in German-style  "dual  education  systems"  which integrate vocational and
technical education with work experience.  In  1994, the Indonesian government introduced a
dual system and currently, all public training institutes designated for the program and a higher-
than-expected  number of small and  medium  enterprises  are participating.  An  apprenticeship
program modeled on the German system is now being tested in the Philippines where during a
30-36 month period, trainees spend 70 per cent  of their working in the firm and 30 per cent at a
training center for the duration of the 30- 36 month program.  Trainees are paid three-fourths of
the minimum wage, but retain only 30 per cent of their wages after paying the training centers. 12
While dual systems have strong features, they  have been criticized for a lack of flexibility and
11  Assessments in the region have identified problems with  the  quality and efficiency of public institutions. In Malaysia, for
example, low salaries have led to shortages of qualified instructors.  A World Bank evaluation of public training  institutions in
Indonesia found low levels of efficiency and capacity utilization.
12 Another apprenticeship initiative in the Philippines allows firms to pay considerably below-market wages to apprentices who
are to receive on-the-job training for up to six months.  Because  the law does not require firms to establish a specific training
program but does allow exemptions on the minimum wage law, a recent review by the government suggests that firms use the
law as a means of exploiting workers.
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to introduce them.
4.3  Job Creation Activities
Traditionally, job  creation has been the major active labor market policy in all of the East
Asian countries.  This has tended to take the form of public works which typically have been
motivated more by social relief than employment development goals.  Two other activities fall
under  the rubric  of "job  creation"  programs  and  are discussed  in  this  section.  The first  is
employment subsidies offered to firms to encourage new hiring or the maintenance of existing
jobs.  These subsidies have been used in Malaysia and Korea.  A final job  creation category
includes  initiatives  to  support  the  self-employed  and  small  and  medium-sized  businesses
(SMEs).  These  initiatives,  which  typically  provide financing  assistance, have  been used  to
varying degrees in all countries.
4.3.1  Public Works
All governments  in East Asia have implemented substantial public works programs  as a
social safety net provision  in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis.  While common in all five
countries at some point in their economic development, the extraordinary growth of the mid-90's
had substantially reduced the need for these programs - either for providing infrastructure or
jobs.  In Indonesia, for example, Padat Karya, that is, labor-intensive job creation programs, had
officially ended in  1994, only to be resurrected in  1997 following extreme drought conditions,
the economic crisis, and political turmoil
There are various design flaws that can limit the effectiveness of public works programs
and these have been issues in East Asian countries.  A common concern stems from the fact that
these  programs  often  have  multiple  objectives  that  may  not  really  be  complementary.
Coordination  can  also  be  a  problem,  with  numerous departments and  levels  of  government
typically carrying out public works with little sense of an overall strategy.
The risk  of these pitfalls  has become  pronounced in  the context  of the  crisis as many
programs have been rapidly introduced or ramped up.  In Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia,
public works programs have  struggled to reach their target populations - mainly as a result of
setting wages too high.  Other design flaws noted in the Indonesian country report were the low
wage bill as a percentage of total project costs and the absence of women in most public works
projects.  The  Philippines  report  identified  a  number of  challenges  including  the  need  for
improved monitoring and  better mapping  of expenditures onto  areas where poverty needs  are
most pressing.
The rush to respond to the crisis before backsliding on recent gains in economic, social,
and human development, created numerous problems in policy coordination and follow-through
on public works projects.  The Thai government, for example, hurried to design and implement
new public works projects by soliciting input from various ministries.  The resulting menagerie
of programs included a number that had previously been dismissed or rated as low priority, but
were implemented anyway  rather than up-scaling existing high-priority public works projects.
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of conceptual  clarity about objectives and beneficiaries due in part to  inadequate labor market
information.  As elsewhere, there were numerous problems of overlap and lack of coordination
among implementing agencies and a virtual absence of program monitoring.
4.3.2  Wage/employment Subsidies (WES)
Providing  incentives to employers to maintain current employment or create new jobs has
not  been a  major policy tool among East Asian  governments, with the notable exceptions  of
Malaysia,  where it has been the primary labor market strategy, and Korea, which implemented
subsidies in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.  The Philippines has two small wage subsidy
programs targeted to young people.
In Malaysia, the government has launched efforts to encourage the private sector to choose
pay  cuts,  temporary  layoffs,  flexible  work  hours,  and  part  time  employmnent  rather  than
retrenchment  of workers.  Initial evaluations of government incentives have reported success in
preventing  unemployment.  Employers seem to be choosing to  cut pay rather than asking  for
voluntary retrenchment or actually retrenching workers.
In  Korea,  employment  stabilization programs  immediately following  the crisis  included
government subsidies to firms that agreed to maintain their current workforce by choosing any of
the  following  measures:  temporary shutdown, reduced working  hours,  in-firm training,  paid
leave  for  employees,  dispatching workers to  weaker affiliates, or switching to a  new  line of
business while retaining at least 60% of its employees.  The employment effects of this program
appear positive.  In a survey of 533 firms receiving government support, managers estimated that
they would have had to layoff 22.3% more workers in the absence of subsidies.
4.3.3  Support for the Self-employed  and SMEs (MEDA)
Many programs have been developed in the region to support the self-employed and small
and  medium-size  enterprises.  These  include  a  variety  of  technical  services  and,  most
prominently,  financing  assistance.  A  number  of  the  programs  described  below  are  not
immediately  driven by  labor market concerns but have been  conceived within the  industrial
policy envelope. Nevertheless, since they are now viewed by the governments as instruments for
encouraging employment, we have included them here.
Financing can be an obstacle for micro and small enterprises and governments everywhere
have responded by introducing programs designed to increase access to credit and in some cases
to  improve  the terms  of financing available. During the crisis,  declines  in product  demand,
increases in production costs, and a credit squeeze have all exacerbated the financing issue thus
creating demand for further government intervention to protect SMEs and their employees. Most
of the programs existed prior to the crisis, but have been provided additional funding.
In the Philippines, SMEs have had access to credit through government programs for many
years.  According to a World Bank evaluation, participating firms have had better performance
on many dimensions than other small firms. However, the magnitude of this job-creation effect
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departments  support self-employment initiatives.  The Self-Employment  Assistance  livelihood
program offers various services including credit and social services delivered at the community
level and targeted to poverty reduction goals.
In Malaysia, various  schemes are available to  entrepreneurs  and  are expected  to  assist
about 12,000 traders and small businesses to set up or expand. In Indonesia, there are at least 24
micro and SME credit programs currently operating.  Some target special groups such as farmers
or  transmigrants, or subsidize credit for  cooperatives  (typically  groups  of  SMEs  with  some
common interests). These latter programs have come under criticism for allowing cooperatives to
profit at the governnent's  expense by borrowing cheap loans and investing the money at higher
interest rates. A recent assessment of credit programs for SMEs in  Indonesia (Wieland,  1998)
recommended that the best government intervention in support of SMEs would be to  create a
more conducive environment for the efficient operation  and development  of the  commercial
financial institutions serving them.
Various technical assistance programs  are also available in these countries. For example,
the  Korean  government  is  developing  "business  incubators"  to  assist  entrepreneurs  with
management training, technological capacity, and office  space. The  Malaysian government  is
providing opportunities for self-employment not only through financing  assistance but through
basic business training to unemployed graduates, supporting  franchise development and various
farming extension services. Indonesia provides technical assistance  through different channels.
For  example, prior  to  the  crisis,  the  government  had  established  the  Small  and  Medium
Industries Development Corporation (SMIDEC) to assist SMIs in the following areas: industrial
linkage,  technology  development,  technology  acquisition,  market  development,  enterprise
development, financial support, and skill development and upgrading.
30Table  4.1: Employment  Services
Services  offered  Public/Private  Labor  Market  Information  Crisis-Specific  Intervention
* Registration  and administration  of  * Recent  easing  of restrictions  on  * New internet-based  career  guidance  * Increased  number  of PES
Korea  unemployment  benefits  private  agencies  and  job search  system  called  "Work-  agencies
* Job search  assistance,  vacancy  Net"  * Implemented  one-stop
tracking,  and placement  * Instituting  new "Worker  Profiling  "Employment  Security  Centers"
* Career  guidance  and counseling  System"
* Major  revisions  in occupational
classification
Indonesia  * Job search  assistance,  vacancy  * Private  agencies  are strictly  * Limited  computer  literacy  of
tracking,  and placement  regulated  administrative  clerks
* Voluntary  registration  of unemployed  * Inter-agency  overlap  &
workers  communication  problems
Malaysia  * Job search  assistance,  vacancy  * Private  agencies  must be licensed  * Computer-based  Employment  * Retrenched  Workers
tracking,  and placement  through  PES  office  and other  Service  Automatic  Reporting  Replacement  Task Force tracks
* Career  guidance  and counseling  agencies  if international  System  and monitors  placements
* Monitor labor mobility
Philippines  * Register  unemployed,  maintain  * Innovative  example:  Private  radio  * Long  term  project  under GATT  * 146  new Public  Employment
national  registry  of skills.  station  airs  job openings  and  takes  Adjustment  Program:  Systematization  Service  Offices (PESO)
* Referral for job placement - locally  calls from seekers and employers  of Labor Market Information and  established in 1998
and overseas.  * Private recruitment agencies are  Employment Counseling.  *  PESO Act of  1999 will establish
* Career  guidance,  job fairs, and  supervised  by government.  *Phil-Jobnet  launched  in Nov. 1998  to  national  facilitation  network  in
placement  in other  ALMP's  Growing  sector;  successful  in  match  job seekers  with employers  every province  and key city.
placement, especially overseas.
Thailand  * Job search  assistance,  vacancy  * Private  agencies  are monitored  * Very  little coordinated  or  * No significant  new initiatives
tracking,  and placement  and supervised  under  Ministry  of  comprehensive  effort to collect LMI
* Job fairs  and  counseling  Labor  and Social  Welfare
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Vocational  Education  System  Public/Private  Training  Innovations  Crisis-Specific  Intervention
* National  training  system  since 1967  * Of approx.  500  vocational  training  * Pilot  program  of training vouchers  * Training  programs  for  the
KOREA  * Ministries  of Labor  and Education  institutes,  237 are in-plant  centers  launched  in 1998  promotes  choice  unemployed  increase  eight-fold
share  responsibility  for TVET  and 178  run  by non-profit  and competition  from 1997  to 1998
* 3.3 million  have  attended  training  organizations  and private  firms
courses  since 1967
Indonesia  * 19 different  government  departments  * Capacity  of private  training  * 1994  implemented  German-modeled  * Public  vocational  education
run 815  vocational  training  programs  centers  is estimated  to be more  "dual education  system" operating  somewhat  threatened  by fiscal
* Ministry  of Manpower  oversees  156  than that  of the public  in 11,000  SME's,  constraints  of crisis
public  training institutions  * Private  training  provision  is
heavily  regulated  and  not
coordinated  with  public  training
Malaysia  * The Ministry  of Human  Resources  * Government  promotes  private  * Human  Resource  Development
oversees  vocational  training  policies  training,  but little  coordination  Council  administers  fund from
which  are administered  through  the  between  public  and private  levies  on firms  to promote  skill
National  Vocational  Training  * Many  agencies  lack accreditation  upgrading  in  conjunction  with
Council,  (public  training)  and the  * Dearth  of public  instructors  due to  business  plans  and needs of the
Human  Resource  Development  low  pay  economy
Council  (private  sector  training).
Philippines  * The Technical  Education  and Skill  * 723  public  and 1,383  private  * Government  awards  scholarships  to  * Expansion  of scholarship
Development  Authority  (TESDA)  vocational  technical  centers  students  to attend  the private  program  and shift  toward  private
oversees  TVET  since 1994  * Private  institutions  server  80%  of  training  institution  of their choice.  provision  of services
* TVET  smaller  than in other  East  those in  vocational  training  * Dual training  system  being tested
Asian  countries
Thailand  * Department  of Vocational  Education  * Vocational  Training  Promotion  * Plan  to improve  training  institutions  * New 3-month  training  courses  to
(Ministry  of Education)  oversees  413  Act of 1994  relaxed  restrictions  hired  2,155  new college  graduates  to  laid off workers  has trained
training  centers  on private  agencies  (a) set up national  database  on  27,000 since  July 1998
* Department  of Skill  Department  * Companies  allowed  to deduct  training  needs  by province;  (b) assist  * Donor-financed  projects  include
(Ministry  of Labor  and Social  training  expenses  from  their  taxes  staff  in training  and supervising;  (c)  training for entrepreneurs,
Welfare)  trains  new entrants  and  * Private  sector  training  is small  but  execute  "In-School  Job Creation"  rubber-tappers,  electronics
current  employees  increasing  dual  training  project  for students.  repair, tailoring,  etc.
32Table 4.3:  Job Creation  Activities
Public Works  Employment Subsidies  Self-Employment and SME Support
* Major  focus  of post-crisis  ALMP's.  In 1998,  * Subsidies  were offered  to firms  * Post-crisis  support  provided  by new Korea Venture
KOREA  400,000  people  participated  in  public  works  maintaining  employment  by reducing  work  & Investment  Fund  Cooperative,  a public  fund of
programs.  hours,  offering  paid leave,  training  100  billion  won
* Internship  programs  for high  school  and college  employees,  temporarily  shutting  down,  or  * "Business  Incubators"  offer management  training,
graduates  will create 10,000  and 57,000  jobs,  dispatching  workers  to weaker  affiliates.  technological  capacity  and office  space
respectively.
Indonesia  * A 4-month,  RP  42 billion-program  targeted  * Government  requires  percentage  of commercial
retrenched  construction  and manufacturing  lending  to small  borrowers  and offers  subsidized
workers  in Decdmber  1997,  credit to cooperatives
*  Massive  public  works  program  with 16 sub-  * At least  24 government  micro  and SME  credit
programs  launched  in April 1998  covered  all  programs  target various  groups  such as farmers,
provinces  and targeted  various  groups;  suffered  transmigrants,  and women.
from lack  of coordination  and  clarity  of objectives
Malaysia  * Public  works  programs  to build infrastructure,  * Primary  labor  market  strategy;  encouraged  * Small  and Medium  Industries  Development
agricultural  development  projects,  and rural  employers  to use  pay cuts,  temporary  Corporation  assists  with  industrial  linkage,
development  projects  are part of ongoing  layoffs,  flexible  work  hours,  and  part time  technology  development  and acquisition,  enterprise
government  policies,  work  rather  than  retrenchment  development,  financial  support,  and skill upgrading
Philippines  * Public  works  projects  in transportation,  * Wage  subsidy  program  for students  * Over 100  "livelihood"  programs  administered  by
agriculture,  environment,  communications,  and  working  during  school  vacations  targeted  government. World  Bank  assessment  found  low
housing  departments  are implemented  with  children  of displaced  workers  after  crisis.  repayment  rates and poor targeting  of poorest.
multiple  objectives. Job creation  often  only  * Multiple  credit  and guarantee  facilities  for SME's.
incidental; no real targeting of most in need.  Ongoing efforts to rationalize these programs
Thailand  * Primary  labor  market  policy  response  to crisis.
Ministry  of Interior  projects  planned  for 1999
estimate  creation  of 788,799  jobs.
* Donor-financed  projects  plan  for provision  of
additional _  Imillion  person-months.  .
335.  Conclusion
What  can policy-makers  in  East Asia conclude  from our  review  of active labor  market
programs? As  a starting point, the OECD experience discussed in section 2 has illustrated the
range of programs  undertaken in the developed countries as well as the sorts of issues that are
involved in this area of public policy. While there are various types of interventions addressing
different policy objectives, our review of the evaluation evidence in section 3 certainly sends out
cautionary  signals.  Ultimately  ALMPs are judged  by  their  performance  in  improving  the
employability and earnings of workers and the evaluations indicate that the investments made
often have little or no impact on these outcomes.
However, in putting forward this evaluation evidence, we are not arguing that policy-makers
in countries without major ALMP investments should avoid this area in the future. First, active
labor market  programs  can serve social objectives, as well as economic. Researchers have not
addressed the question of these social impacts, which may be more positive. Second, workforce
development, the social and economic integration of marginalized and at-risk groups, and the
situation of unemployed workers are central concerns for policy-makers and ALMPs are obvious
instruments  to  address  these. Third, the disappointing  performance of these prograrns  in the
aggregate masks the fact that some program designs do seem to lead to positive outcomes  for
some types  of workers. Moreover, in the 1990s, policy makers in some countries have utilized
novel and promising  approaches to ALMPs including, for example, new roles  for the private
sector and innovative tripartite arrangements. The challenge is to learn from existing experiences
and innovations and to direct future programming along lines that appear to work.
But the evaluation evidence does suggest that policy-makers should be realistic about what
ALMPs can  do and that investments in this area should be made carefully and modestly.  As
policy-makers in the East Asian countries look down the road, we recommend that they carefully
consider the following issues relating to the formulation of an active labor market policy:
Priority  setting. As we have noted, active labor market programs  can have various  policy
objectives  including  reducing  unemployment  in  cyclical  downturns,  correcting  structural
imbalances, improving labor market functioning, and assisting disadvantaged groups of workers.
In  designing  an  overall  strategy, it  is important to  identify  which  of  these  are the  priority
objectives since it is the objectives that should determine program choices and program design.
Regardless of the specific objectives, one immediate and high priority should be to develop a
strong employment service since this is the first link in the ALMP chain.
The roles of the public-and private sectors. This is a key consideration both in developing
an overall strategy and in designing and implementing programs. At one time, governments in
the OECD region developed and delivered virtually all ALMPs but, increasingly, governments
have reconsidered the respective roles of the public and private (and non-profit) sectors. In many
countries, possibilities have opened up for the other sectors to play important roles, at least in the
delivery of services. This can lead to more diverse, innovative, and cost-efficient services and to
programs that  are more closely oriented to labor demand. However, even where the scope for
private sector  involvement is considerable, governments retain the central role. They must  be
responsible for the overall  system, ensuring that it remains focused on public priorities.  They
must  also  address  distributional  issues (e.g.,  adequate service  for all  types  of workers)  andprovide  critical public  goods.  They  also  must  be the  catalyst for  harnessing  private  sector
involvement in retraining and other aspects of active labor market policy.'3
Promoting partnerships and dialogue. The identification of priorities for active labor market
policy and program choices can benefit from ongoing dialogue between government, business,
labor, and other relevant organizations (e.g., service providers). Where this dialogue is conducted
effectively, policy-makers can maintain  a close connection with the needs of the labor market
and can maximize support for ALMPs. The dialogue needs to be carried out both at the level
where  priorities  are  set  (e.g.,  nationally)  and  where  programs  are  delivered  (e.g.,  locally).
Governments typically must be the leaders and catalysts for ensuring this process.
"Infrastructure "for  the labor market. Infrastructure services are critical if ALMPs are to be
a useful policy instrument. By "infrastructure,"  we mean labor market information, a viable and
complete network  of employment  service offices, and certification and  accreditation systems.
These services are the cornerstones of an effective system: They inform the program choices that
should be made. They provide the bridge between the labor market, service deliverers, workers,
and employers. And they are necessary for  ensuring quality throughout the system. As largely
public  goods, these  are inevitably  the responsibility  of governments. In countries where  the
development of an active labor market policy  is at an early stage, these infrastructure services
should be the first priority.
Coordination within government.  In many  countries, ALMPs are complicated by the fact
that many government agencies are involved and that coordination among them is insufficient.
Generally, this appears to apply to the East Asian countries. There are two problems associated
with this coordination issue. First, multiple departments often are responsible for various aspects
of active labor market programming  and mechanisms are not in place  to ensure that they are
working together in an efficient manner which  often leads to a duplication of effort.  Second,
priority-setting and programming  in the ALMP  area are often not sufficiently coordinated with
overall  economic  planning.  Both  of  these  problems  need  to  be  addressed  through  intra-
government  coordination  to  ensure  the  relevance  and  efficiency  of  active  labor  market
programming.
Policy  and  administrative/operational  capacity.  Designing  and  implementing  ALMPs
requires considerable capacity within government. In many ways, this is a more complicated area
than passive income  support programming.  Capacity needs do differ significantly by program.
For  example, public  works  can  be  relatively  straightforward to  design  and implement; as  a
consequence, these are often the major  active labor market interventions in many developing
countries. On the other hand, employment services require a network of facilities with extensive
geographic coverage, the resources  (technological and know-how) to generate and disseminate
accurate and timely  labor market information, skilled counselors, and reliable connections with
the  employer  and  educational  communities.  Training  programs  also  require  labor  market
information plus training and occupational standards, monitoring and evaluation capabilities, and
capacity  (increasingly  in  the  private  or  non-profit  sectors)  to  deliver  good  programs.
Governments must recognize that capacity building is a slow but essential process.
13 For discussions of these aspects of goveriment  roles, see ILO (1998) and Betcherman, McMullen, and Davidman
(1998).
35Financing ALMPs.  The starting question here concerns the balance of public and private
financing. Clearly, the rationale for public spending is strong: market failures exist with respect
to human capital investments and there is a public good element to ALMPs. However, there are
also  private  gains  afforded  to  employers and  employees  as  a  result  of  training  and  other
interventions and governments need to think about how this can be reflected in financing. They
should consider the applicability of innovative financing arrangements (e.g., income-contingent
loans) that address market imperfections but reflect the private-return aspect of ALMPs. In terms
of public financing, the essential choice for policy-makers is to draw from general revenues or to
finance  ALMPs  through  earmarked  funds  based  on  employer  and  (perhaps)  employee
contributions.  There  are  important  considerations  attached  to  each  relating  to  fungibility,
assumptions about responsibility for labor programs, funding integrity, and incentives for formal
employment  creation. OECD countries have used a full range of funding arrangements which
offers useful experience for countries in East Asia.
Monitoring and evaluation. This is a key part of capacity and deserves special mention.  In
spite of the large public expenditures on ALMPs in  OECD countries,  rigorous evaluations of
these programs  have been  relatively uncommon.  In an  effort to  improve  the targeting  and
efficiency of social programs,  sound impact evaluation techniques should be used to evaluate
active  labor  market  programs.  A  good  evaluation  compares  labor  market  outcomes  for
individuals who have gone through a particular program with those of a control group of their
peers, and also utilizes data on program costs to attempt to answer questions such as: what  are
the impact estimates of the program on the individual; are the impacts large enough to yield net
social gains; and is this the best outcome that could have been achieved for the money spent.
There are clearly many considerations involved in developing a strong active labor market
policy. And the experience of the OECD countries, plus the resources required, suggest that East
Asian countries should move slowly to build on what already exists. Nevertheless, over the long
run, building ALMP capacity will be important as formal labor markets grow and as a skilled
workforce  becomes  more important. Nations now  need to  think about priorities, the role  of
government,  and  a  range  of  issues related to how  ALMPs  should be  carried  out. Given  its
foundation  role,  "infrastructure"  needs  to  get immediate  attention. And  as  the  East  Asian
countries continue to develop, ALMPs will need to become part of the policy "tool-kit."
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